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PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN 
HEGEL'S PHAoNOMENOLOGIE 
AND ENZYKLOPA:DIE 
Robert Grant MeRAl 
THERE is reason to believe that Hegel would consider our concern with presen-tation a form of contemporary "misology", - the retreat of thought from the 
substantial contradictions of its own ma king to a mere interest in the vagaries of the 
immediate. But this con cern, endemic to much current philosophie thought, represents 
a mediation of the present with the past in a truly speculative sense, for it is with the 
self-consciousness of the current standpoint that antecedent configurations progres-
sively reveal their absolute depth. Let it be added that the necessities of presentation 
are particularly integral to the realization of Hegelian science, and it is our position 
that the link between absolute knowing and the system proper cannot be understood 
aside from the act of presentation itself. 
Presentation has this signifiance because it is both an externalization hy a 
universal self and a recollection of absolute content, thereby closing off the self-
alienation of the absolute as spirit in time. Indeed, the tension between absolu te 
substance and its self-knowing that is indicative of this alienation, remains a part of 
speculative presentation itself, making presentation a peculiarly spiritual pheno-
menon. Naturally we hope that sorne of these suggestions will cease ta have their 
assertive quality and become self-evident in the analysis to follow. 
Generally speaking, according to Hegel, the absolute is already close to us 
through its self-presentation under three aspects. Absolute substance has been 
externalized in its fortuitous happening as real history, coming on the scene through 
the onesided determination of a "regional" natural consciousness. Once this 
externalization of the substance in history is complete, there arises the possibility and 
the need to present the entirety of this content according to its concept, but first as 
this content appears for natural consciousness. This second presentation enables 
natural consciousness to understand the absolute determination of its universal self, 
and ends with the instigation to present that determination as it exists in-and-for-
itself. 1 
1. Heidegger concludes that we can know the absolute al ail on Iv bccause the absolute "lets itscW' be 
presented. "In keeping with its absoluteness. the Absolute is with us of its own accord. ln its will ta be 
with us. the Absolule is being present. In itself. th us bringing itself forward, the Absolutc is for itself. 
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Although the absolute content of each presentation remains essentially the same, 
this content appears under different aspects according to the fullness of its self-
conscious appropriation. This differcntiation has two immediate consequences: the 
second and third presentations merely "look back" on the original appearance of the 
absolute in history; and more preciscly, these two presentations (i.e., the Phiinomeno-
lagie and the system) fully present an identical content, but from different stand points. 
Through speculative science, the absolute idea is present at hand and absolutely 
present as presentation, - the in-and-for-itself self-knowing essential structure of the 
actual. 
Consequently our analysis of speculative science must go beyond textual 
exegesis ta an understanding of Hcgel's justification of the 'word' as the true clement 
in which the absolute is present ta us and ta itself. This involves the concomitant 
delineation of the manner in which the labour of presentation supersedes the 
existence of the particular individual as speculative scientist, ta become a presentation 
of a universal self for contemporary natural consciousncss. As long as this 
consciousness is characterized by its intuitive time-viewing, the presentation of the 
absolute as text raises the question of the relation between its timeless actuality and 
spirit in its temporal mode. 2 
The beginning of speculative science, then, is that th in king which witnesses and 
merges with the will of the absolute ta be present to itself. This beginning is « the free 
act of thinking which places itself at the standpoint where it is for-itself, and where it 
generates its object and presents it to itself. »3 However the full self-presentation of 
the absolu te in the form of speculative philosophy is both the result of seientific 
witness and its immediate presupposition, a presupposition which determines 
presentation as the specifically philosophic comprehension of the non-philosophie 
life of the absolute content in history. This means that we must examine the extent to 
which a strictly philosophic presentation can offer itself as an exoteric truth ta an 
initially non-philosophie natural eonsciousness. 
That speculative science is intended as an exoteric knowledge for contemporary 
natural consciousness is evident from its differentiation into its appearing for natural 
consciousness and ils actuality in-and-for-itself. In speaking of the path of pheno-
menal knowing as an introduction or a first part of speculative science we are simply 
designating the chronologieal succession of texts as they arrive on the scene for 
consciousness: looked at from the absolute standpoint, the Phiinomenalogie is an 
appearance of the entire content of the system. The transition from the one to the 
other is guaranteed less through the necessity of their succession' 'for" consciousness 
than through their original identity in the act of presenting a common absolu te 
content. In other words, the transition is guaranteed through the differentiation of 
For the sake of the will of the parouslO alone, the presentation of knowlcdge as a phenomenon is 
necessary." Hegel'.\· Concept of Experience, cd. J. Gray, Harper & Row, N. Y., 1970. p. 48. 
2. These are issues not foreign to biblical exegesis, and as wc shall see, the relation of bcliefby a knowing 
subjeet to a text presented "for" il poses similar problems. 
3. Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). ed., F. Nicolin and O. Poggeler, 
Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1969, Ein.lil7, p. 50. 
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the mode of presentation, a differentiation ultimately determined by the exigencies of 
the absolute idea itself. 
It is because of the systematic structure that lies "beneath" the exoteric path of 
phenomenal knowing, and hence is only yet an appearing, that this path has its 
salutary role as a ladder to the scientific standpoint. In the Introduction to the 
Phiinomenologie Hegel states that, "The experience of itself which consciousness goes 
through can, in accordance with its concept, comprehend nothing less than the entirc 
system of consciousness, or the entire realm of the truth of spirit. For this reason, the 
moments of this truth are presented in their own proper determinateness, viz. as 
being not abstract moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness 
itself stands forth in its relation to them." 4 The presentation of phenomenal knowing 
is a "whole" in itself because it comprehends the full range of the determinations of 
the concept as the y first appear in consciousness, but the mode of appearance itself is 
related to the question of presentation. 
The works posterior to the Phiinomenolofiie regard the latter as an appearing of 
speculative science and as the appearing of speculative science's absolute content. In 
the Wiss. der Logik Hegel says that "the concept of pure science and its deduction is 
therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the Phiinomenologie des Gei.~tes 
is nothing other than the deduction of it", and again that "pure science presupposes 
liberation from the opposition of consciousness." 5 However, inspite of these 
statements as to the necessary presupposition of the Phiinomenofogie, the closed circle 
of the system itself seems to rule out an introduction to speculative science which is 
also somehow a part of that system. The only solution to this di lem ma is the 
conception of the Phiinomenologie as an appearing of science, - an appearing which 
leaves the dialectieal integrity of the system intact whi\e at the same time presenting 
its truthfor consciousness. 
In addition to this "necessary" first appearance of speculative science for 
consciousness as described in the Logik, we find in the Enzyklopiidie the suggestion 
that the determinations of the system, tao, have their presentation first as they exist 
for consciousness in the Phiinomenologie. Hegel says, "In my Phiinomenologie des 
Geistes, which on that account was at its publication described as the first part of the 
system of science, the course taken was to begin with the first, simplest appearance 
(Erscheinung) of spirit, with Immediate consciousness, and to sketch the dialectic of 
this consciousness developing toward the stand-point of philosophical science, the 
necessity of this latter being shown through the process." This appearing science, like 
the system itself, looks back on the fortuitous manifestation of the absolute in history 
and re-presents that content according to its concept. 
Again we must emphasize that the difference between the two is that the 
Phiinomenologie presents the determinations of the system as they first appear to 
4. Phanomenologie des Geis!es. cd., J. Hoffmeister, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1952. Fin., p. 74. 
Phenomenology afSpirit, trans., A.V. Miller, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1977, (56). The page numbers 
of the English translations wIll be placcd in parentheses following the German citation. 
5. J.Visscnscha{1 der LOl{ik, vol. 1, ed .. G. Lasson, Meincr Verlag. Hamburg, 1932, p. 30. Hegef'.\ Science 
of LOl{ic, trans., A.V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin. London, 1969, (49). 
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natural consciousness. Hegel continues: "The development of the shapes, the specific 
object of philosophical science, thus is just as much a part of what at first only 
appears in the limited form of the development of consciousness ; this development 
must, so to speak, go on behind the back of this consciousness, in so far as its content 
is retained as the in-itself of consciousness." 6 This absolute content, and its 
development in shapes, only becomes explicitly for-itself in the self-conscious 
presentation of the system, where consciousness understands that content as its own. 
WeIl, what evidence is there ta suggest that the main determinations of the 
system appear firs! along the path of phenomenal knowing prior to their recollection 
in absolute knowing? The section of the Enzyklopéidie devoted to phenomenology 
offers sorne interesting indications in this regard, particularly paragraph 11437,7 Hegel 
says, "Reason as the Idea (#213) appears here in the determination of the opposition 
between the concept and reality in general, of which it is the unit y , and has here the 
more precise form of the for-itself existing concept, of consciousness and the concept 
over against external objects present at hand." x The significance of this remark is 
that Hegel seems to identify the conclusion of the Logik with its concrete determi-
nation in consciousness as "Reason", and the Zusatz attached to this paragraph 
merely confirms this impression. 9 
In the Phanomenologie this formaI unit y of concept and objectivity in reason 
then goes on to realize itself in the observation of nature and as spirit until it achieves 
in absolute knowing the philosophic comprehension of the totality of its determi-
nations through 100 king back on its content, - a realization that follows the broad 
outlines of the system itself. This equally implies that the configurations prior to that 
of reason, i.e., those that make up consciousness and self-consciousness in the 
Phanomenologie, roughly correspond to the moments of objective logic and subjective 
logic in the system, The extensive chapter on reason itself presents "for" cons-
ciousness the observation of nature and of subjective spirit (the logical and 
psychologicallaws, physiognomy and phrenology).lo 
But it is essential to keep in mind that the determinations of the logic, the 
philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit arc presentcd as they first appear 
6. Enz. Vorbegriff. #25 R, p. 59. 
7. The following interpretatlün seeks to reconcile O. Poggeler's argument in "Qu'est-ce que la 
Phénoménologie de l'Esprit"" Archives de Philosophie, avril-juin 1966, p. 2261., that the Phiin. is an 
appearing of the system and W. Marx's argument in Hegel's Phenomenofogl' olSpirit, trans. P. Heath, 
Harper & Roy, N.Y" 1975, p. 87, that it is an appearing of the absolute, through an understanding of 
the relation between absolute knowing and presentation. 
8. Enz. #437 R., p. 354. Hegel's Philosophy ofMind, trans., W. Wallace, Zusatze trans. by A.V. Miller, 
Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1971, (177). 
9. Enz. #437 Zusatz. (177). "What we have called in the previolls paragraph universal self-consciousness, 
that is in ilS truth the concept of Rcason, the concept as it cxists not merely as the logical Idea, but as 
the Idea has developed into self-consciousness. For, as wc know from logic, the Idea consists in the 
unit y of subjectivity or the concept, and objectivity." 
!O. For a sketch of the correspondance of sections see the Appendix to this article. In his reference to this 
Appendix, P.-J. Labarrière rightly points out that a more detai!cd parallel would be impossible due to 
the different modes of presentation. Cf. Introduction à une lecture de fa Phénoménologie de l'esprit, 
Auhier-Montaigne, Paris, 1979, p. 282 f. 
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from the stand point of natural consciousness, and thus contain much infcrcntial, 
historical material. For example the science of subjective spirit appears fifst tel the 
understanding under the crude aspect of phrenology, because true science is possible 
only once this consciousness has traversed ail the configurations in their immediate 
appearing and recollected them al the level of absolu te knowing. Similarly. the 
moments of the logic are not presented in the Phanomenologie as they exist in-and-
for-themselves, but as they ini[ially are manifest in the configurations or cons-
ciousness. 
The eorollary of this suggestion that the broad determinations of the system first 
appear as the path of phenomenal knowing presented for natural consciousness is 
that the Phiinomenologie constitutes a thematic whole. In other words, the theories 
which assert that the Phanomenologie "should" have terminated after the chapter on 
Reason, Il as does the phenomenology in the system, cannot account for the necessity 
that the Phanomenologie must repeat ail the determinations of the system if it is 
equally to "look back" on the totality ofthose determinations as they firs! appear in 
history. And if the "ideal" determinations of consciousness, self-consciousness, and 
reason did not make up a part of subjective spirit in its timeless actuality, then the 
system would be unable to supersede either the standpoint of the Phanomenologie or 
that natural consciousness. 
The necessity that the entire system appear as phenomenal knowing, thereby 
giving that knowing a systematic unit y, derives largely from the exigencies of the 
speculative presentation of the absolute ideaY The absolute is already present at 
hand for contemporary natural consciousness of its own volition, so that it is for 
speculative science to simply witness this presence "when at the close it lays hold of 
its own concept, i.e., only looks back on its knowledge." 13 Thus philosophic 
presentation itself demands that the path of phenomenal knowing merely look back 
on the whole, without truncating that path in order to provide a partial and 
consequently external "introduction" to speculative science. The Phiinomenologie is 
justly more than such an introduction because it is an appearance of the system of 
II. Notably the theory of Th. flearing and hls "disciples" Hoffmeister and Hyppolitc. Howevcr 
Hyppolirc admits rhat."Ccst comme une exigence interne qui pousse la raison individuelle il dc'cen,!' 
un monde pour soi-même comme esprit. et l'esprit à se découvrir comme esprit pour soi dans la 
religion. La méthode de la prise de conscience qui a dominé tout le développement de la conscience 
s'étend à tous les phénomènes de l'esprit, et la Phénoménologie de la conscience individuelle devient 
nécessairement la Phénoménologie de l'esprit en général." Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologze de 
l'Esprit de Hegel, Aubier, éd. Montaigne, Paris, 1946, p. 58. 
12. Because Hyppolite does not understand the importance of the initial presentation of the absolu!e 
content "for" consciousness. he claims, "Que Hegel ait pu présenter tout son système sous la forme 
d'une Phénoménologie de l'esprit - traitant aussi bien du développement de la conscience indiVIduelle, 
que du savoir de la nature, du développement de l'esprit objectif aussi bien que de la religion - avant 
d'atteindre le savoir absolu, cda paraît bien indiquer qu'il y a une certaine ambiguïté dans 
l'interprétation de l'hégéiianisme.·' Ibid., p. 59. Labarrière, on the other hand. correctly points out 
that, "Il ne faudra pas oublier cette signification essentielle du terme de 'Système' ou de 'Science', qui 
s'applique déjà au mouvement de la Phénoménologie comme telle, en essayant d'éclairer les relations 
qu'elle entretient avec les œuvres postérieures: il n'y a en vérité qu'un seul déploiement de l'Esprit, 
même s'il se donne à connaitre. ici et là, sous les modalités différentes." Slructures et MorlyemcllI 
Dialeczique dans la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel, Aubier, éd. Montaigne, Paris, 196~, p. 248. 
13. J:.:nz. #573, p. 451 (302). 
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absolute determinations : the absolute is close to us only through its self-presentation, 
and not through any arbitrary propaedeutic. 14 
The absolute appears in the Phiinomenologie not merely as presentation but as a 
specifically philosophie presentation. The effieaeious effeet of philosophie presen-
tation as the pure element of absolute presence in whieh that presence aehieves 
perfeet self-eertainty is the result - and most importantly - the presupposition of 
the system of science. This raises the question as to whether philosophie recolleetion 
and presentation ean sympathetieally look baek on non-philosophie life and repeat 
that life aeeording ta the concept without inadvertently altering its partieular essence. 
And if the answer is no, then we must wonder whether the path of phenomenal 
knowing ean truly aet as a ladder from non-philosophie natural eonseiousness to the 
stand point of philosophie science, or whether that path is not sim ply the philosophie 
comprehension of non-philosophie life, - and thus the esoterie possession of a few 
individuals. 
These questions turn on the ability of Hegel ta demonstrate that the truth of 
philosophie presentation is somehow already implieit in the determinations of 
spirituallife. And if this demonstration is to be eonvineing "for us", then it must be 
c1early evident that eontemporary non-philosophie life needs this presentation at the 
present moment if it is to supersede the spiritual divisions of its own making. In 
summary, an investigation into the mode of presentation as the "final" moment of 
spirit's self-externalization takes us into the heart of the problems that plague natural 
eonseiousness at this stage of its edueational history. 
14. O. Püggeler lays to rest once and for al! the theorics 01 Haering in his "Qu'est-ce que ... " op. cil .. 
p. 206 ff., but introduces a ncw theory which cmphasizes a shift in focus and plan (from that of a 
science of experience to a phenomenology of spirit) while Hegel was writing. Pôggeler centres on the 
chapter on Reason as the turning point in this ,hif!: "Dans la science de l'expérience, un chapitre sur 
la réalisation de la raison a-t-il été prévu dès le début, cela demeure douteux. Cependant ce chapitre est 
au fond exigé par ce plan tel que Hegel l'expose dans l'Introduction." Op. cir., p. 226, Howevcr 
W. Marx' remarkable "immanent analysis" of the Introduction and the Preface in his Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit. op. cit., has rccently provided the most convincing aCCollnt of the thematic 
llnity of the Phiinomenologie. 
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APPENDIX 
appearing science 
I-III. eonseiousness 
IV. self-eonsciousness 
v. reason 
- the certainty and truth of reason 
- observation of nature 
- observation of self-consciousness 
VI. spirit 
VII. religion 
VIII. absolute knowing 
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system 
objective logie 
subjective logic 
the idea 
philosophy of nature 
subjective spirit 
objective spirit 
} absolute spirit 
